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Abstract
In this paper, I study the effect of displacement (in the sense of forced migration) of
parents during a violent conflict on investment in their childrens’ education years later.
Using the ethnic division during the Bosnian War as a natural experiment, I plausibly
identify exogenously displaced households and compare them to households who did
not have to move because of the war. Displaced parents spend between 20 and 30%
less on the education of their children in primary and secondary school. The result also
holds for single expenditure positions like textbooks, school materials and annual
tuition in secondary school. A number of robustness checks and nearest-neighbor
matching is performed to confirm the finding. A decomposition of the causal effect
shows that differences in income and the stock of durable goods can at most explain
one third of the finding. Potential explanations for the reduced spending of displaced
parents on education include altered preferences through the exposure to violence,
increased uncertainty about the future, and financial constraints.
JEL Classification: I25; J15; O15
Keywords: Displacement; Conflict; Education
1 Introduction
Violent conflict is a regular phenomenon in the developing world and its long-term
consequences can be substantial through the destruction of human and physical capi-
tal, damage to infrastructure, and forced population movements. However, research on
the economic consequences of wars and other violent events have only recently gained
momentum as micro-level data from conflict areas become available. This is an impor-
tant line of research as it indicates to policy makers the direct consequences of violent
conflicts and which issues need to be dealt with once a conflict is over.
The findings in this literature offer interesting insights into peoples’ lives in war-torn
countries and on the effects of exposure to conflict. However, forced migration has seen
relatively little attention, even though the UNHCR counts 10.4 million refugees and 36
million people of concern in 2009 in their Global Report (UNHCR 2009). In this paper I
study the effects of displacement of parents on educational expenditure on their children.1
I use the ethnic division during the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 as a natural
experiment for displacement. The war divided the previously ethnically mixed Bosnia and
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Herzegovina into two parts and through “ethnic cleansing” resulted in two areas of homo-
geneous ethnic make-up. The resulting displacement of part of the population enables
me to uncover its causal effects. The identification strategy circumvents the problem of
endogenously migrated households by using only households whomoved across the front
line during the war. No significant difference in time invariant household characteristics
support the assumption that treatment was exogenous.
The short time span between the end of the war and the collection of the data set does
not allowme to evaluate educational outcomes of children of displaced parents. However,
the education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina requires parents to provide textbooks,
uniforms, school materials etc. to their children, which gives me the chance to look at
inputs in educational production. In particular, I am interested in parents’ education
expenditure on their children.
I find that displaced parents spend significantly less on the education of their children
five years after the end of the war than comparable households that were not displaced.
The estimates of the reduction in spending on education range from 20 to 30%. Con-
sidering that the average household in Bosnia and Herzegovina spends more than half a
monthly household income on the education of a child per year, this is quantitatively a
large difference. The finding is robust to a number of specifications and nearest-neighbor
matching estimates confirm the magnitude. Displaced parents also spend significantly
less on single expenditure positions like annual tuition in secondary school, textbooks,
and other school materials.
Recent experimental evidence suggests that students’ test scores react positively to addi-
tional educational inputs within a given institutional setting (Das et al. 2013), confirming
an intuition that has been challenged in the past.2 As small an investment as $3 per
student spent mostly on child’s stationary, classroom materials, and practice books can
increase test scores by 0.1 standard deviations in India (Das et al. 2013). As Hanushek
(2003) points out, there is evidence that increased school quality has positive effects on
labor market outcomes and productivity.
Exploring the causal channels through which displacement influences education expen-
diture, I show that at most one third can be explained by differences in income and wealth
levels. The employment status of parents also fails to explain a major part of the differ-
ence, so there is no evidence that displaced parents substitute school inputs for increased
parental effort as found by Houtenville and Smith Conway (2008). Potential explanations
for the reduced spending of displaced parents on education include altered preferences
through exposure to violence, increased uncertainty about the future, and tighter financial
constraints.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the literature, Section 3
discusses the background of the study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the data and
the identification strategy, while Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 discusses
some channels through which displacement works and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The availability of micro-data from a large number of developing countries has greatly
increased the possibilities of researchers to investigate the effects of violent conflicts at the
individual and household level. A large number of papers look at the effects of exposure to
violence on school attainment (eg. Akresh and de Walque 2008; Swee 2009; Shemyakina
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2011; Chamarbagwala and Morán 2009; Merrouche 2006; Rodriguez and Sanchez 2009).
Most of these studies find a negative effect for at least a subgroup of the population
even after the end of the violent spell. Justino (2011) surveys this literature. Swee (2009)
analyzes the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and finds lower completion rates in sec-
ondary school through exposure to a violent conflict. However, he argues the effect is
driven by youth soldiering and should not have long-run consequences. Since displace-
ment is a direct consequence of potential exposure to violence, my findings contribute
to the understanding of why educational production is affected even after the end of the
violence.
The destruction of schools during periods of violence often fails to explain the reduc-
tion in educational attainment as that would affect boys and girls in the same way, which
is often not the case (Shemyakina 2011). Swee (2009) argues that youth soldering has pre-
vented older males from attending school, while Shemyakina (2011) explains that girls
were kept at home to avoid sexual assaults and harassment on their way to school. León
(2012) finds evidence that the death of teachers and the health status of parents could be
the causal mechanism.
In a recent addition to the literature Pivovarova and Swee (2012) suggest that all
these findings could be driven by “selection into victimization”, ie. wartime displacement
changes the composition of the population.3 For the case of Nepal, Pivovarova and Swee
(2012) show with panel data that the problem is empirically relevant.
Exposure to violence also has impacts on peoples’ preferences. Bellows and Miguel
(2009) find that it increases civil participation, while Voors et al. (2012) find that pref-
erences towards risk, the discount rate, and altruistic behavior towards neighbors are
affected.
The effects of displacement have also been studied in a number of papers. Fiala (2009)
finds that displaced households have in general fewer assets and lower consumption qual-
ity. Only the previously poorest are marginally better off after displacement. Lower asset
holdings of displaced households are also confirmed by Rahim et al. (2013). Kondylis
(2010) shows that displacement makes men more likely to be unemployed and women
more likely to be out of the labor force in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the long-run Sarvimäki et al. (2009) find positive effects on income for displaced
agricultural workers in Finland, which is confirmed by Bauer et al. (2013) for Germany.
However, the latter find lower income for the rest of the displaced even for the second
generation. The positive long-run effects of displacement found in Sarvimäki et al. (2009)
and Bauer et al. (2013) are likely due to increased sector and geographic mobility of the
displaced population. With the exception of Bauer et al. (2013), the above mentioned
contributions focus on the effect on the generation of the displaced, however the negative
consequences of displacement do not need to end there.
3 Context, data, and identification
3.1 The Bosnian war
Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent in the Fall of 1991 after the breakdown
of former Yugoslavia. The three major ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, were
struggling to gain power and eventually the conflict turned violent in April 1992. Initially
all three ethnic groups were fighting each other, with the Serbs in control of the army
of the former Yugoslavia (Silber and Little 1996, p.222). In February 1994, Croats and
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Bosniaks reached a peace agreement and eventually joined forces against the Serbs. With
air support from the NATO, Bosniaks and Croats were able to push the Serbs back and
regain control of large areas. The Bosnian War ended in December 1995 with the Dayton
Agreement, according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two entities
along the front line at the end of the war: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Republika Srpska. During the war about 100,000 - 110,000 people were killed and an
estimated 1.3 - 1.8 mio. were displaced (the total population in 1991, the year of the last
official census, was 4.38 mio.).
The extensive displacement during the war led to mostly ethnically homogeneous geo-
graphic areas. After the war most Bosniaks and Croats lived in the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and most Serbs in the Republika Srpska. Those two entities are like
separate states with their own administration and they currently cooperate only in a few
areas. As Dahlman and Tuathail (2005) show with two examples, in ethnically mixed
municipalities that were split between the two entities, the ethnic groups were almost
completely segregated by 1998 along the entity borders, which was not the case before
the war. However, the Dayton Agreement declares that all refugees and displaced persons
have the right to return to their homes of origin and get their property returned (Tuathail
and O’Loughlin 2009, p.1047). The return migration peaked in the years 2002-03,
but a large fraction of the displaced population does not plan to return to their pre-war
homes. Also the majority of the properties of displaced households in their home munic-
ipalities was occupied by others, destroyed, or damaged (Tuathail and O’Loughlin 2009,
p.1051).
3.2 The education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina faces many challenges and changes
these days. As of 2001, primary education lasts for 8 years, where during the first 4
years the entire material is taught by one teacher and in grades 5-8 each subject has its
own teacher. Secondary education is divided into vocational training and gymnasium
(more academically oriented), where curricula are taught in 3-5 year programs (UNESCO
1996; UNESCO 1997). In general, primary schools have no annual tuition, but textbooks,
school materials, etc. still need to be payed for by the parents. Only few municipalities
ensure that textbooks for disadvantaged are provided (OECD 2006). Low or non-existent
incomes, migration, and difficult post-war conditions are common reasons why parents
are unable to be “active parents” and fail to provide school equipment, supplies, and
textbooks (UNESCO 1996).
The post-war financial situation for schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina was con-
strained, to say the least, as this paragraph from a report about the education system in
the Republika Srpska illustrates (UNESCO 1997, p.ii.):
“Primary education is, in theory, free, and is financed from the government budget. In
practice the government is often unable to pay salaries, and school repairs have often
become the responsibility of the municipal authorities. At the secondary level the
central government is expected to pay the salaries of personnel, and the municipality
all other charges. It was reported that in December 1996 public sector employees,
including teachers, had not been paid for 4 to 5 months. The education system today
is largely dependent on financial sacrifices made by teachers and families. Textbooks,
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for example, are extremely expensive: an average primary school text costing DM 1-3.4
[DM = Convertible Mark] and a secondary one as much as DM 7”.
Reports show that the curriculum for primary school is designed for a child equipped
with 10 textbooks per grade. For most parents that seems hardly affordable, given that a
qualified teacher earned in 1996 only 120 Convertible Mark per month (UNESCO 1996)
and unemployment is high.4 In the years following the publication of these reports, some
reforms concerning the curriculum took place and in 2004 primary school was extended
to 9 years (Swee 2010). International aid has certainly improved some issues, but it is
unclear if this reduced the parents’ financial burden of having children in school. A project
report on the education reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the European Union from
2008 observes (EU 2008): “The education reform process evolves at an uneven and slow
pace”.
3.3 Data
For this study I use household survey data from the “Living Standard Measurement
Survey” (henceforth LSMS) (State Agency for Statistics of BiH et al. 2001) of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The data collection started in 2001 in 25 municipalities with about 5,400
households. From 2002-2004 about half of the households were reinterviewed each year
to form a 4-year panel data set. The LSMS covers a wide range of topics. The differ-
ent sections ask questions about housing, education, health, labor, credit, migration, and
social assistance. There are also sections on consumption, household businesses, and agri-
cultural activities. For most of this paper, I use the cross-sectional data from 2001. I do
this for two reasons: First, the sample size is reduced in the panel data to half the number
of households, and second, the 2002-2004 interviews cover a limited number of topics. I
will go into more detail about data issues in the respective sections.
3.4 Identification
In order to seriously estimate an effect of displacement on household behavior, the treat-
ment of displacement must be at random, ie. ex ante, households in both, treatment and
control group, do not differ in their characteristics, neither observable nor unobservable.
Given that displacement is a form of migration, this is a strict requirement to satisfy. In
this section I argue that the Bosnian War provides a rare, although sad, opportunity to
study this by-product of violent conflict. I think of displacement as a version of migration,
where the instinct of self-preservation dominates all economic considerations. The single
most important push-factor is survival, while pull-factors of certain destinations do not
pose a problem to the estimation of a causal effect, as municipality fixed effects are always
included in the regressions.
My identification strategy, in a nutshell, is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnicities
were mixed before the war. The Bosnian War introduced a line of division along which
two ethnically homogeneous territories emerged. The front line was not drawn by eco-
nomic motives and people did not sort themselves into displacement but were forced
by their instinct of self-preservation. The random course of the line of division and the
absence of self-selection allow me to identify the effect of displacement on household
behavior by comparing households that crossed the front line to households that did not
move during the war.
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At the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of former Yugoslavia, the pop-
ulation was a mix of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats in most municipalities. The ethnic
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 caused many people to leave
their home and take refuge on the other side of the front line. Table 1 describes this
homogenization of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The share of Serbs in
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shrank to 2.3% from 17.6%, while the share of
Bosniaks (Croats) went down to 2.2% from 28.1% (1% from 9.2%). Serbs were leaving from
the Bosnian/Croatian side of the front line to the Serb side and Bosniaks/Croats the other
way round.
During the war, Bosniaks and Croats in the Serb territory were at risk of being killed,
what became to be known as “ethnic cleansing”. A main goal of Serb forces was to create
an ethnically homogeneous territory within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs beyond the
front line faced a similar fate and were abandoning whole villages within a few days (Silber
and Little 1996, p.358). Even after the Dayton Agreement was signed, displacement did
not come to a halt. Several villages in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and sub-
urbs of Sarajevo are reported to have been abandoned after the local Serbs realized they
were trapped in Bosniak territory (Silber and Little 1996, p.30). Thus displacement during
and after the war produced for the most part ethnically homogeneous regions.
Of course displacement status is not a question in the LSMS and has to be inferred
from the data. The data include the municipality of residence right before the war and the
location of residence in 2001.When a person did not move at all, he/she enters the control
groups of non-movers. If a person resided on the other side of the front line before the
war than he/she does in 2001, the person is considered displaced. People who changed
their location of residence but did not cross the front line or people who returned to their
pre-war residence are dropped. A household enters either the control or treatment group
when both, the household head and his/her spouse, did not move or got displaced.
Note that the identification strategy implies the ethnicity of a person. A person living
in the current Republika Srpska before the war and is now living in Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the person is considered to be a displaced Bosniak. Conversely, a per-
son, who has moved from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war to
Table 1Main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Overall)
Bosniaks Serbs Croats
1991 43.5% 31.2% 17.4%
1996 46.1% 37.9% 14.6%
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosniaks Serbs Croats
1991 52.3% 17.6% 21.9%
1996 72.5% 2.3% 22.8%
Republika Srpska
Bosniaks Serbs Croats
1991 28.1% 55.4% 9.2%
1996 2.2% 96.8% 1.0%
Source: Official census in 1991 and unofficial census conducted by the UN in 1996.
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the Republika Srpska after the war, is considered to be a displaced Serb. However, infor-
mation about the ethnicity of a person is not available in the first wave of the data set,
but only in the smaller second wave. Hence, I can test this prediction of the ethnicity by
the migration pattern only on this smaller sample. Table 2 reports the ethnicities of the
groups of non-movers and displaced people. Out of 1,040 displaced individuals, there is
one Croat and no Serb in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one Bosniak and
one Croat in the Republika Srpska. The ethnicity mix in the sample of non-movers is not
as clear-cut, which probably originates in the presence of enclaves in both, the Republika
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, these enclaves do not
pose a threat to my identification, because these people did not got “treated” by forced
displacement, neither did they endogenously decide to migrate. The evidence in Table 2
is a strong argument in support of my identification strategy.5
The first main threat to the identifying assumptions would be a systematic course of the
front line so that economically different areas were divided. If economically undeveloped
areas were targeted and conquered during the war, the displaced households were poorer
than their non-mover counterparts already before the war. Kondylis (2010, p.241f) dis-
cusses this possibility and concludes that the war was “determined more by geo-strategic
motives rather than economic motives”. The Serb invasion followed the goal to connect
the Serb stronghold around Banja Luka with the Serb nation. In addition, Kondylis (2010)
provides evidence that pre-war educational attainment is uncorrelated with war casualties
(and hence developed areas were not more contested) and there is no clear connection
between the pre-war ethnic mix and war intensity.
The second key assumption implies that, ex ante, displaced households were not dif-
ferent from non-mover households. One possibility is that households of a certain type
could have moved into areas, where they were especially exposed to the risk of displace-
ment. This includes, for instance, a Bosniak family moved to Banja Luka (now the capital
of the Republika Srpska) before the war so the household head could take a good posi-
tion there. The data does not suggest evidence of sorting before the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as 70% of the household heads in the data still lived in their municipality of
birth just before the war. Considering the small size of the average municipality in Bosnia
and Herzegovina of 373 km2, this suggests that households generally do not exhibit high
mobility. Moreover, the results of the paper are not sensitive to restricting the sample to
households who still resided in their birth municipality just before the war. If the results
Table 2 Displacement by ethnic groups
After-war entity of residence
Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina Republika Srpska








Ethnicity data are from the second wave of the the LSMS on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which only includes half of the
household from the first wave. The number of observations is reported.
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are purely driven by pre-war geographic sorting, the findings would vanish in such a
selected sample.
Another potential problem is that households with certain characteristics were dis-
placed, while others at the same location and of the same ethnicity did not move,
and hence displacement was not a life-saving treatment as suggested earlier. In terms
of observable characteristics displaced and non-mover households do not differ as the
descriptive statistics in Table 3 show.While Serbs in the sample weremore likely to be dis-
placed, there is no significant difference in other household characteristics. There is also
no difference in the distributions of the highest level of education achieved and the age
of the household head using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test.6 The
column “Regression” reports the point estimate of a regression of the household charac-
teristic on the displacement indicator and municipality fixed effects. However, regional
differences are not a problem as municipality fixed effects are included in all regressions.
Table 4 tests whether the pre-war household characteristics are jointly correlated with
displacement. In a regression of the displacement indicator on the characteristics, only the
dummy variable for the Serb territory is a good predictor of displacement. The variables
of household and child characteristics (the number of children of the family in school, a
dummy variable for the oldest child of the family, a dummy for female children, years of
education and age of the household head) are unable to significantly explain displacement.
A joint test of the five household/child characteristics can not reject the hypothesis that
displacement is a non-selective process. The results do not change when municipality
fixed effects are included in column 2.
Even if household characteristics of displaced and non-movers are not significantly
different from each other, pre-war experience could still affect education decisions.
Although, each ethnicity has nominally their own language, there are only minor dif-
ferences in the spoken word (Mappes-Niediek 2009, p.30). One might argue that the
Table 3 Descriptive statistics and exogeneity of displacement
All Not moved Displaced Difference Regression
Displaced Family 0.189 0 1
Republika Srpska 0.44 0.40 0.61 0.21***
(0.037)
Number of Children 1.81 1.81 1.81 0.00 0.09*
of Family in School (0.056) (0.054)
Oldest Child 0.41 0.41 0.40 -0.01 -0.01
of Family (0.023) (0.025)
Female Child 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.01 0.02
(0.028) (0.030)
Education of 10.30 10.34 10.10 -0.25 -0.22
Household Head (0.279) (0.305)
Age of 45.74 45.80 45.47 -0.33 -0.87
Household Head (0.735) (0.834)
Municipality FE Yes
Observations 1,952 1,584 368 1,952 1,952
Significance levels: * :10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
The column “Regression” reports the point estimate of a regression of the household characteristic on the displacement
indicator and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 4 Regression output: displacement
Dep. variable: displaced family
Republika Srpska 0.136***
(0.0239)
Number of Children -0.000 0.021
of Family in School (0.0150) (0.0148)
Oldest Child -0.011 -0.009
of Family (0.0154) (0.0140)
Female Child 0.008 0.011
(0.0080) (0.0110)
Education of -0.004 -0.004
Household Head (0.0038) (0.0036)
Age of -0.002* -0.002






Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
The F-value (p-value) corresponds to a test of the joint hypothesis that the effects of the five control variables (not the
geographic control for the Republika Srpska) are zero.
group of displaced were ethnic minorities before the war and were ousted by the majority
population. This is true at the entity level, but in more narrowly defined regions the dis-
placed were often the ethnic majority but had to flee nevertheless. As Mappes-Niediek
(2009, p.44f ) describes it is a myth that households were driven out by neighbors of differ-
ent ethnicity, but mostly by militants form other parts of Yugoslavia or soldiers. Reports
describe ethnically different neighbors to have been close friends and attempted to pro-
tect each other from attacks. Since the three different ethnic groups have lived together
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a long time (the geographic distribution of ethnic groups
in 1910 is very similar to the one in 1991) and the lack of major conflicts between those
groups indicates that no group was suppressed by another one. Hence, there is limited
reason to suspect a systematic pre-war difference of the later displaced population to the
non-movers. Put differently, the pattern of displacement in a certain municipality was
arguably driven by the geopolitical situation and not by the characteristics of a certain
group in that municipality.
A final concern to identification is international migration/displacement. The Ministry
for Human Rights and Refugees (MHHR 2003) reports the number of international
refugees as 1.2 million between 1992 and the end of the war, which is more than a quar-
ter of the total population in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war. About half of this
group returned to their home country until 2003. This is potentially a threat to the iden-
tification strategy if the families who left Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war have a
characteristic that is different to the people who stayed in the country and if the treatment
and control groups are unequally affected.
For this purpose I compare the displaced Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the res-
idents of the Republic of Serbia who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 using the
LSMS of Serbia in 2002. Serbs living in the future Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Eder IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2014, 3:12 Page 10 of 24
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/12
(the Bosniak territory) before the war had the choice between internal displacement and
displacement/migration to the Republic of Serbia. I find that household heads and their
spouses in the Republic of Serbia have on average 1.4 years more of education and are 4
years younger (results not shown).
These numbers suggest that the internally displaced are different from the exter-
nally displaced, which confirms the finding of Kondylis (2010) for migration to Western
European countries. However, the fact that within Bosnia and Herzegovina the dis-
placed and the non-movers are indistinguishable in terms of education and age (Table 3)
indicates that my treatment and control groups were equally affected by internal displace-
ment/migration and international displacement/migration is therefore not a problem for
identification. Anyways, the problem of international migration/displacement is com-
mon in the literature on conflicts, because micro data set usually restrict the sample to a
country.
4 Main results
The treatment effect of displacement on education expenditure is estimated by Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) of the estimating equation
yi,j = δdi,j + Xi,jβ + ηj + εi,j, (1)
where yi,j is the log. of education expenditure on child i in municipality j, di,j is the dis-
placement indicator, Xi,j are exogenous control variables (ie. exogenous in the sense that
they are not influenced by displacement as well as uncorrelated with the error term), ηj is
a municipality fixed effect, and εi,j is an error term. The standard errors are clustered at
the household level to account for intra-household correlation of the error term.
The selection issues discussed in the previous sections would be a problem if di,j and
εi,j are correlated. However, the discussion showed that many issues can be ruled out. I
also employ nearest neighbor-matching as an alternative estimation method to check the
robustness of the OLS findings.
4.1 Preliminary evidence
In a first step, I plot the Kernel density function of education expenditure of displaced
and non-mover households against each other. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows the uncondi-
tional densities while Panel (b) depicts deviations from municipality means. It is clearly
visible that the whole distribution of the displaced households is shifted to the left of the
distribution of the non-mover households, both, unconditionally and in deviations from
municipality means.
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the various expenditure groups per child in
Convertible Mark, the local currency. In a regression of the expenditure category on
the displacement indicator and municipality fixed effects, only few categories show a
significant difference. A simple difference of means between non-movers and displaced
households would not be informative due to regional variation in education expenditure,
therefore the regression.
Education expenditure is not a trivial part of total expenditure for households in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The average annual expenditure on education per child is 267.1 Con-
vertible Mark, while the average total household income per month in the data set is 481
Convertible Mark. On average 4.6% of the annual total household income is spent on the
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(a) Unconditional difference (b) Within-municipality difference
Figure 1 Difference in education expenditure of displaced vs. non-mover households. Panel (a) shows
the unconditional difference, while Panel (b) displays within-municipality differences.
education of a child. This a high price to pay for generally “free” education, which causes
Mooney and French (2005) to suggest financial support for the education of children of
displaced households.
In most specifications I use the sum of all expenditure classes, because of the group
called “Total cost (not included in previous classes)”. This expenditure class forms a pool
for expenses, that parents cannot classify or do not bother to split up into the exact
Table 5 Descriptive statistics: education expenditure by classes
Mean Standard deviation Regression
Annual Tuition 12.1 (58.9) -3.6
(2.39)
Special Tuition 2.1 (25.2) 1.6
(1.99)
Membership Fee for 0.7 (16.5) -0.1
Parent’s Association (0.22)
School Uniforms and 36.5 (89.4) -7.7
other School Clothing (4.98)
Textbooks 35.3 (53.6) -2.5
(4.51)
Other School Materials 31.5 (34.5) -2.4
(2.55)
Food and Lodging 44.2 (104.0) -16.3***
(5.7)
Other Costs 19.9 (71.9) -13.6***
(4.27)
Total Costs (not included 84.9 (275.5) -28.8**
in previous classes) (14.62)
Expenditure on Education 267.1 (316.4) -73.4***
(sum of all groups) (17.18)
Municipality FE Yes
Observations 1,952
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
Values are denoted in Convertible Mark. The column “Regression” reports the coefficient of a regression of the expenditure
category on the displacement indicator and municipality fixed effects. A direct comparison of means between non-movers
and displaced households is not informative due to regional variation in education expenditure.
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groups. The problem is that the group “Total cost (not included in previous classes)” is
negatively correlated with all other groups, which suggests that some households do not
take the effort to split up the expenditures into the various classes and put everything into
this group. Since dropping such households would reduce the sample size considerably,
I use the sum of all groups in the main specifications to avoid the loss of many observa-
tions. In additional specifications, I restrict myself to a number of selected groups and
drop the households that use the class “Total cost (not included in previous classes)”.
4.2 Total causal effect
In this section, I present the estimation results for the total causal effect of displacement
on education expenditure. The robustness checks show that the difference in spending on
education holds across various specifications. An exact interpretation of dummy variables
in semi-logarithmic regressions is provided in the row “Transformation” following van
Garderen and Shah (2002). However, the exact interpretation deviates from the regression
coefficients only slightly and also statistical significance remains unchanged.
The main results are reported in Table 6: the findings indicate a highly significant and
robust drop in education expenditure in all specifications. Quantitatively, the difference in
education expenditure between displaced parents and parents that did not move during
the war is in the ballpark of 25 to 30% depending on the specification. Column (1) reports
the difference controlling only for the entity of residence. Including control variables for
child and parent characteristics (column (2)) hardly changes the estimated effect. The
inclusion of municipality fixed effects increases the effect to a difference of almost 30%,
which is identical between the two entities as column (4) shows.
Column (5) tests whether displaced parents discriminate between boys and girls, but
shows that there is no significant difference. In column (6) I interact the displacement
variable with the secondary school variable to test whether the difference in education
expenditure originates in primary or secondary school. The point estimate of the interac-
tion term is zero and hence displaced parents spend less in both, primary and secondary
school.
In column (7), I control for the grade of school the child is in. This variable might
be influenced by displacement, as children of displaced parents might only attend lower
grades and therefore educationmight be cheaper. Then the difference in education expen-
diture would not be a decision of the parents, but imposed by the system. However, when
the grade of the school is included in the regression, the point estimate increases to a
difference of almost 33%.
In Table 7, I estimate the effect of displacement using a nearest-neighbor matching
estimator. This method pairs individuals of ex ante comparable observable character-
istics who differ only by treatment status and calculates the difference in the outcome
variable (matching by covariates). The matching estimator may improve upon simple
regression by comparing only individuals with similar observable characteristics and by
doing so hopes to also balance unobservable characteristics. Hence, matching can reduce
a potential bias of the estimated treatment effect due to selection issues if the distribution
of observable characteristics contains information on the distribution of unobservable
characteristics.
The average treatment effect in column (1) is a difference in education expenditure
of 33%, while the average treatment effect on the treated in column (2) is 44%. These
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Table 6 Regression output: education expenditure I
Log. of education expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Displaced Family -0.250*** -0.240*** -0.294*** -0.299** -0.346*** -0.299*** -0.329***
(0.0699) (0.0697) (0.0670) (0.1187) (0.0763) (0.0722) (0.0663)
Displaced Family × Republika Srpska 0.009
(0.1434)
Displaced Family × Female Child 0.111
(0.0977)




Grade of School 0.074***
(0.0074)
Republika Srpska 0.461*** 0.455***
(0.0536) (0.0540)
Number in Children of Family in School 0.083* 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.021 -0.003
(0.0430) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0345) (0.0344)
Oldest Child of Family 0.236*** 0.246*** 0.245*** 0.244*** 0.205*** 0.153***
(0.0430) (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0402) (0.0407)
Female Child 0.058 0.064 0.064 0.043 0.069* 0.065
(0.0444) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0470) (0.0410) (0.0402)
Education of Household Head 0.014* 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.016**
(0.0084) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0077)
Age of Household Head 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.004
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Transformation -22.29*** -21.56*** -25.64*** -26.39*** -29.47*** -26.03*** -28.21***
(5.423) (5.458) (4.974) (8.705) (5.376) (5.334) (4.753)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952
R-squared 0.054 0.071 0.201 0.201 0.202 0.215 0.244
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
The line “Transformation” reports approximate unbiased estimator of the percentage change of a dummy variable in a
semi-logarithmic regression (Kennedy 1981) and its standard error following van Garderen and Shah (2002).
numbers confirm the OLS results and are actually larger than those. The results are
robust to an increase in the number of neighbors the treated observations are matched to.
Column (3) includes only an indicator for the Republika Srpska and finds a difference of
22%, which is comparable to the OLS estimate. The inclusion of regional control variables
actually pose a violation of the assumptions of matching where the matching variables
must be unaffected by the treatment. However, displacement affects the location of resi-
dence by definition. Column (4) tests the case without regional control variables and finds
a similarly significant result. Hence, if matching is better able to deal with selection into
treatment than OLS and it produces similar results, selection does not seem to drive the
main findings of Table 6.
A closer look at some education expenditure groups is taken in Table 8. For this table,
I restrict the sample to the 1,325 children, whose parents split up all their costs to the
detailed expenditure groups and did not use the category “Total Costs (not included in
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Table 7 Regression output: nearest-neighbor matching
Log. of education expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Displaced Family -0.330*** -0.440*** -0.222*** -0.205***
(0.0822) (0.0772) (0.0701) (0.0653)
Average Treatment Effect Yes Yes Yes
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Control for Republika Srpska Yes
No. Observations 1,952 1,952 1,952 1,952
Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Nearest-Neighbor-Matching is performed on the basis of the usual control variables (number of children in school in the
family, indicator for the oldest child, indicator for a female child, the education of the HHH, and the age of the HHH). Every
treated observation is matched to a single untreated one.
previous classes)”. Including a child with zero reported expenditure on textbooks, for
instance, and a single position in the group of unclassified expenditures would lead to
unreasonable results in these regressions.
In primary school (grades 1-8) only few parents pay annual tuition and as column (1)
shows, there is no significant difference in spending. However, in secondary school, where
areas of specialization are offered, there is a large and significant difference between chil-
dren of displaced and non-mover parents. Regression (2) shows a reduction by about
80%. In terms of other school material, which includes notebooks, pencils, etc., there is a
difference of 17.1%. The spending on textbooks in column (4) is conditional on positive
spending on textbooks by anyone in themunicipality, because in somemunicipalities text-
books are provided by the municipality or the federal government. The difference is still
a significant 21.4%. Adding up these three groups, which seem to be especially important
for the quality of education, I estimate a difference of 14.6%.
These results suggest that displaced parents restrict expenditures on the education of
their children wherever they can, that is even in matters like the choice of the secondary
school and the provision of study materials.
Table 8 Regression output: education expenditure II
Annual Annual Other school Important
tuition tuition materials Textbooks groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Displaced Family 0.148 -0.805*** -0.171** -0.214** -0.146**
(0.1371) (0.2937) (0.0759) (0.0910) (0.0617)
Primary School Only Yes
Secondary School Only Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 984 341 1,325 1,101 1,325
R-squared 0.078 0.278 0.164 0.724 0.428
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Control variables include number of children in HH enrolled in school, education of HHH, age of HHH and dummy variables
for being the oldest child and females. Only households with zero expenditure in the residual category “Total Costs (not
included in previous columns)” are used in all regressions. In the regression “Textbooks”, only municipalities with some
positive expenditures were used. “Important Groups” is the sum of the previous three groups. All independent variables are
in measured in logs.
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The specifications in Table 9 perform some robustness checks. If someone outside
the household paid for education expenditures and that is the reason why parents
spend less, the difference in education expenditure could be inconsequential for edu-
cational output. Das et al. (2013) show that anticipated public supply of additional
school inputs in India and Zambia is offset by an expenditure reduction of parents. For-
tunately, the LSMS records the expenses paid from someone outside the household,
however only as the total amount. Including these expenditures and running the base-
line regressions with the new dependent variable in column (1) reduces the difference in
education expenditure to 23.8% but remains highly significant. Restricting the sample to
the households without any outside funds for education in column (2) shows a slightly
increased difference of 30.6%. These findings imply that the reduced education expen-
diture is not driven by displaced households who are substituting for additional external
funds.
In column (3) dummy variables for rural and mixed municipalities are interacted with
the displacement dummy, while the base group are urban municipalities. The interac-
tion terms produce positive, but insignificant point estimates, while the difference in
the base group is estimated at 37%. When the sample is restricted to households that
still lived in their municipality of birth just before the war, one can rule out that some
households self-selected to a higher risk of displacement through migration before the
war and now drive the main finding. This can be ruled out as the restricted sample,
that did not migrate before the war, also spends 29.1% less on the education of their
children.
To sum up, I find a strong negative relationship between displacement and the spending
on the education of their children. The result is robust to a number of sample restrictions
and the inclusion of various control variables.
Table 9 Regression output: education expenditure III
Log. of education expenditure
All funds Original Original Original
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Displaced Family -0.238*** -0.306*** -0.370*** -0.291***
(0.0723) (0.0721) (0.0971) (0.0830)
Displaced Family × 0.151
Rural Municipality (0.1646)
Displaced Family × 0.183
Mixed Municipality (0.1563)
No Funds from Outside of Household Yes
Never Moved before War Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,947 1,827 1,952 1,454
R-squared 0.170 0.202 0.202 0.184
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Control variables include number of children in HH enrolled in school, education of HHH, age of HHH and dummy variables
for being the oldest child and females. “All Funds” includes education expenditures paid by someone from outside the
household. Column (2) restricts the sample to households that do not receive funds for education from outside the
household. Column (4) restricts the sample to households who still lived in their municipality of birth before the war.
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5 Channels
So far the paper focused on estimating the total causal effect of displacement on education
expenditure, but has not offered a channel through which this effect might work.
However, it is of great interest to researchers and policy makers alike to understand the
mechanisms through which displacement operates. I first start with some econometric
considerations to guide the analysis.
5.1 Econometric considerations
The estimation of the channel through which displacement works faces two issues: First,
including a variable of a channel introduces an endogenous variable and hence OLS
produces biased estimates. And second, the proper counterfactual of an evaluation of a
channel changes the interpretation of the estimation results.
5.1.1 Evaluating the indirect effect
The following two equations describe the effect of displacement through an intermediary
variablemi (eg. income) on education expenditure. Municipality fixed effects are omitted
for simplicity.
yi = δ1di + Xiβ1 + ρ1mi + θ1midi + ε1i (2)
mi = δ2di + Xiβ2 + ε2i (3)
In these equations, displacement has a direct effect δ1 on education expenditure,
changes the intermediary variable through δ2, and might influence the effect of the inter-
mediary variable on education expenditure through θ1. Simply including the intermediary
variable and its interaction with displacement introduces an endogeneity problem as
Cov(ε1i, ε2i) might be nonzero. In the case of Cov(ε1i, ε2i) = 0, the OLS estimates in
equation (2) will be biased (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p.64). However, the bias can be
signed: Using income as an example, it is most likely that Cov(ε1i, ε2i) > 0, as high
income households aremore likely to value educationmore. This causes the estimate of ρ1
to be biased upwards, ie. the indirect channel of displacement-on-income-on-education
expenditure captures too much of the total effect and hence results in a downward bias
of δ1.
5.1.2 Counterfactual
The second problem in these regressions concerns the proper counterfactual. The ques-
tion I want to answer with these regressions is: “Would the household spend less on
education even if displacement would not have changed the intermediary variable?” In
a usual regression of education expenditure on a displacement indicator, the intermedi-
ary variable, and its interaction with displacement, one has to do some calculations to get
a precise answer to the question above and hypothesis testing gets more difficult. How-
ever, when the intermediary variable is redefined a single parameter delivers a sufficient
answer.




] = α + δdi + ρmi + θmidi.
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Redefine the intermediary variable by subtracting the average of the intermediary
variable of the non-displaced households:
m˜i = mi − E [mi|di = 0]
Then the expected difference in education expenditure between displaced and non-
movers, given no change of the intermediary variable by displacement is
E
[
yi|di = 1, m˜i = E
[
m˜i|di = 0
]] − E [yi|di = 0






Therefore the transformation of the intermediary variable allowsme to estimate the dif-
ference in education expenditure under the assumption of no change of the intermediary
variable through displacement with the single parameter δ. All other estimators remain
unchanged because variances and covariances do not change by subtracting a constant.
5.2 Income, the stock of durable goods, and the housing situation
One of the most natural explanations for the difference in education expenditure is that
displaced families have lower income and wealth. It is not surprising that displaced house-
holds have lower labor income and wealth, especially real estate, than households that did
not have to move during the war. When households get displaced, they usually do not
have time to sell their real estate, which is often the most valuable asset of a family. If dis-
placed families rent a dwelling while the non-mover families have inherited a house to live
in, it would not be surprising that displaced households spend less on education of their
children.
The descriptive statistics in Table 10 document that displaced households experience
a significant reduction in income, the stock of durable goods, and are less likely to own
the dwelling they live in. Total income is lower for displaced households, but higher non-
labor income (pensions and allowances) partly counterbalance the reduction in labor
income. Also the share reporting zero labor income of 36.1% is a lot higher than that of
non-movers of 19.1%. A large difference is in the stock of durable goods, which can be
considered as a proxy for wealth as data on financial assets is not available.
The last three rows show the limited information on the housing situation available.
The share of families that own the dwelling they live in is almost eight times as high
for the non-movers than it is for the displaced. Displaced families mostly rent the place
they live in, but a share of almost 16% live in a place without paying for it (either on
loan from friends or families, as illegal occupants in abandoned houses, or in emer-
gency lodges). These differences are prime candidates to explain the large reduction in
education expenditure found earlier.
Income and wealth is controlled for with several different variables. Household labor
income measures the sum of labor income reported for the last month by household
members. Household non-labor income measures the sum of pensions and allowances
per month received by household members, while total household income is composed
of the sum of the two aforementioned variables. The variable durables is the sum of the
values of reported durable goods in the household, but not financial assets or real estate.
Dummy variables for a reported value of zero for any of those variables are included in the
regressions to allow for more flexibility. The housing situation is coded in three indicator
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Table 10 Descriptive statistics: income, durable goods, and housing
All Not moved Displaced Difference
Total HH Income 481 492 437 -54**
(27.3)
Total HH Income 527 539 473 -66**
(conditional on > 0) (28.2)
Share with Zero Total 0.086 0.088 0.075 -0.013
HH Income (0.016)
HH Labor Income 404 426 313 -113***
(27.4)
HH Labor Income 521 527 490 -37
(conditional on > 0) (33.9)
Share with Zero 0.224 0.191 0.361 0.170***
HH Labor Income (0.024)
HH Non-Labor Income 77 66 124 58***
(8.9)
HH Non-Labor Income 188 174 229 55***
(conditional on > 0) (15.7)
Share with Zero 0.590 0.621 0.458 -0.163***
HH Non-Labor Income (0.29)
Stock of Durable Goods 2,688 2,884 1,852 -1,032***
(244.7)
Stock of Durable Goods 2,795 3,002 1,915 -1,087***
(conditional on > 0) (251.8)
Share with Zero 0.038 0.040 0.033 -0.006
Stock of Durable Goods (0.011)
Housing Situation: 0.655 0.790 0.108 -0.682***
Own Dwelling (0.023)
Housing Situation: 0.264 0.148 0.733 0.585***
Rent Dwelling (0.022)
Housing Situation: 0.081 0.062 0.159 0.097***
Live for Free (0.016)
Observations 1,901 1,541 360
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Income is relates to monthly income. All income and wealth values are in Convertible Mark.
variables for ownership of dwelling, renting a dwelling, or living in the dwelling without
paying for it.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 11. Remember that the point estimates
of the first row estimate the difference to the counterfactual of no reduction of income
and/or durables. Also the unexplained part of the displacement effect is a lower bound as
discussed above. However, the difference in education expenditure is surprisingly robust
to the inclusion of income and durable goods variables. The difference decreases only
slightly and rules out income and wealth differences as the main mechanism. Similarly
the indicator variables for the housing situation fail to explain the difference in education
expenditure.
The dummy variable for displacement remains significant at the one-percent level in
most specifications and at the five-percent level in the regressions with the housing vari-
ables. The most flexible specification with income and durable goods variables in column
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Table 11 Regression output: income, durable goods, and housing
Log. of education expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Displaced Family -0.293*** -0.233*** -0.254*** -0.257*** -0.209*** -0.316** -0.329**
(0.0676) (0.0701) (0.0683) (0.0669) (0.0686) (0.1407) (0.1384)
Log. HH Total Income1 0.074* 0.051
(0.0401) (0.0422)
Displaced Family × 0.035 0.029
Log. HH Total Income1 (0.0788) (0.0799)
Log. HH Labor Income1 0.042 0.009 0.001
(0.0516) (0.0555) (0.0583)
Displaced Family × 0.076 0.072 0.094
Log. HH Labor Income1 (0.1062) (0.1128) (0.1142)
Log. HH Non-Labor Inc.1 0.026 0.023 0.015
(0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0448)
Displaced Family × 0.006 -0.001 0.006
Log. HH Non-Labor Inc.1 (0.0800) (0.0799) (0.0806)
Log. Durable Goods1 0.065** 0.052* 0.060** 0.052*
(0.0266) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0306)
Displaced Family × 0.055 0.046 0.015 0.034
Log. Durable Goods1 (0.0559) (0.0568) (0.0589) (0.0604)
Own Dwelling1 0.161 0.160
(0.1453) (0.1502)
Displaced Family × 0.096 -0.200
Own Dwelling1 (0.2789) (0.2820)
Rent Dwelling1 0.207 0.233
(0.1558) (0.1607)
Displaced Family × 0.093 -0.073
Rent Dwelling1 (0.2361) (0.2398)
Zero Indicator1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Displaced Family ×
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zero Indicator1
F-test 7.51*** 4.37*** 5.92*** 4.18*** 2.99*** 5.61*** 2.12**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,783 1,783
R-squared 0.250 0.253 0.251 0.255 0.258 0.216 0.231
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Control variables include number of children in HH enrolled, education of HHH, age of HHH and dummy variables for being
the oldest child and females. “F-test” results from a test of joint significance of displacement and all its interactions.
1Measured as the difference to the mean of non-movers.
(5) shows a difference in education expenditure of 20.9% after controlling for labor and
non-labor income and the stock of durable goods. This is still two-thirds of the total causal
effect. When the housing variables are included, there is actually a slight increase from
the total causal effect estimated previously.
To conclude, differences in income, the stock of durable goods, and the housing sit-
uation can explain at most one third of the total effect, but do not seem to be the
main mechanism. There still seems something else to be going on that was induced by
displacement of the parents.
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5.3 Employment status of parents
Another mechanism to explore is whether differences in the employment status of the
parents cause the education expenditure difference. If both parents are working, par-
ents may not have the time to help their children learn and therefore spend more on
books and school materials to make up for less personal support (Houtenville and Smith
Conway 2008). The descriptive statistics in Table 12 show that displaced parents are less
likely to be employed. This mechanism could therefore explain the difference in education
expenditure.
I test this hypothesis by including indicator variables for employment status of both par-
ents (or a single parent), the spouse of the household head, and if no parent is employed in
Table 13. Interaction terms of the employment indicators with displacement are included
as well. Again the mean of the non-movers of each employment variable is subtracted
from the indicator variable to interpret the displacement dummy as the aforementioned
counterfactual. In the three following columns I add one dummy variable and the inter-
action term at a time. None of these coefficients is significant at a traditional level as can
be seen in Table 13.
As with income, the coefficients show that only a small portion of the difference in
education expenditure can be explained by the employment status of the parents, at most
about one tenth in the last regression. The main mechanism through which displacement
affects education expenditure is still undetected.
5.4 Preferences, uncertainty, and financial constraints
In summary, neither income, the durable goods level, the housing situation nor the
employment status of the parents are able to account for the majority of the differ-
ence in education expenditure. The natural question is then: How does the effect come
about? Unfortunately, I am not able to fully answer this question. This section discusses
additional explanations.
A possible explanation is that displaced households are able to buy cheaper schoolmate-
rials and textbooks or share the supplies with other families. Displaced households in
an area may build networks to help each other. However, it is hard to imagine that dis-
placed households find a way to save on education expenditure that households who did
not move during the war do not find, especially with their social network in place. The
non-movers in Bosnia andHerzegovina are not exactly rich to pass up a possibility to save.
Voors et al. (2012) present evidence from field experiments in Burundi showing that
exposure to violence affects preferences. In detail they report more altruistic behavior
Table 12 Descriptive statistics: parent’s employment status
All Not moved Displaced Difference
Both Parents Employed 0.29 0.30 0.23 -0.07***
(0.026)
Spouse of HHH Employed 0.28 0.29 0.23 -0.06**
(0.026)
No Parent Employed 0.34 0.30 0.48 0.17***
(0.027)
Observations 1,901 1,541 360
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
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Table 13 Regression output: parent’s employment status
Log. of education expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Displaced Family -0.281*** -0.290*** -0.276*** -0.274***
(0.0687) (0.0682) (0.0696) (0.0689)
Both Parents Employed1 0.097 0.056
(0.0674) (0.0723)
Displaced Family × 0.165 0.203
Both Parents Employed1 (0.1529) (0.1689)
Spouse Employed1 0.095
(0.0676)
Displaced Family × 0.062
Spouse Employed1 (0.1476)
No Parent Employed1 -0.147** -0.129*
(0.0705) (0.0756)
Displaced Family × 0.017 0.099
No Parent Employed1 (0.1340) (0.1470)
F-test 9.74*** 9.34*** 8.08*** 6.14***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901
R-squared 0.202 0.200 0.202 0.204
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%.
Control variables include number of children in HH enrolled, education of HHH, age of HHH and dummy variables for being
the oldest child and females. “F-test” results from a test of joint significance of displacement and all its interactions.
1 Measured as the difference to the mean of non-movers.
towards neighbors, more risk taking, and a higher discount rate. For my purpose the
higher discount rate is of special interest. If displaced households were more exposed to
violence than non-movers, as can be expected, then displaced parents could have a higher
discount rate than parents who were not displaced. Individuals with a higher discount
rate would invest less in projects that generate a payoff in the future - such as education.
Unfortunately, with the crude consumption data available, such a hypothesis can not be
tested seriously.
Two other potential explanations come to mind. First, displaced households face a lot of
uncertainty about the future and try to prepare themselves by cutting down spending on
every non-vital position, which includes education expenditure. In a simple two period
model, an agent with convex marginal utility reduces consumption in the first period if
the risk of period 2 income increases. Kimball (1990) calls this phenomenon prudence and
defines it as “the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty”.
In 2001 the restitution of property to internally displaced households and the possibility
to return to their homes from before the war was still an issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Many displaced households probably faced a highly uncertain future. On the other hand
one could argue that increased uncertainty through displacement prompts households to
invest more in highly mobile assets, such as human capital, which they could take with
them if they ever had to change location again.
The second potential explanation are financial constraints. Displaced households could
face tighter financial constraints due to the loss of their social network for credit or
the lack of property they could use as collateral. Unfortunately, financial assets are not
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included in the survey to infer about financial constraints. Even if financial constraints are
not binding now, the expectation that they will bind in the future would already induce
households cut back on expenditures today (Deaton 1991).
However, I am not able to give a full explanation how the difference in education expen-
diture comes about. A change in the discount rate of displaced households, increased risk,
and financial constraints are consistent with the findings of this paper, but other channels
through which displacement works can not be ruled out in general.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the consequences of violent conflicts by look-
ing at the effect of displacement, in the sense of forced migration, on investment in
education. I find a robust statistical relationship between the displacement status of par-
ents and the amount spent on the education of their children. The reduction of education
expenditure through displacement is in the range of 20 to 30% compared to parents who
did not move during the war. The estimated difference in education expenditure is robust
to many specifications and a series of tests indicate that selection bias is not the source of
the result. Nearest-neighbor matching on covariates finds quantitatively similar effects.
A number of channels of how displacement might affect education expenditure are dis-
cussed. Differences in income and durable goods levels can explain at most one third of
the baseline result. A lower ownership rate of housing among displaced households also
fails to explain the main finding. The employment of parents and support from outside
the household can also be ruled out as the main mechanisms.
I further discuss recent experimental findings on the effect of exposure to violence on
preferences, the hypothesis that the displaced households face more uncertainty about
the future, or more rigid financial constraints than non-movers. That would lead them to
cut back spending on every non-vital position, including the education of their children.
More work needs to be done to fully understand how violent conflict influences peoples
lives. Research has shown negative consequences of exposure to violence and displace-
ment, but how exactly the changes in economic outcomes come about is not fully
understood yet.
Endnotes
1The term “displacement” refers to forced migration and is different to job loss, which
the labor literature often refers to as displacement.
2As Das et al. (2013) show, when parents expect to receive additional resources, they
substitute out of their own educational expenditure and therefore the total educational
inputs available to students do not increase much. This substitution is likely responsible
for the failure to find positive effects in previous experimental studies.
3A problem for the estimation of causal effects emerges as the often used
difference-in-difference approach between birth cohorts of treatment and control
regions does not account for non-random wartime displacement. This generates a
sample correlation between outcomes and conflict intensity that is not the causal effect
of exposure to conflict.
4Detailed reports about conditions at schools during the academic year 2000-01 are, to
my knowledge, not available.
5Croats are hardly found as displaced people in the data, because households of Croats
who found them self in Serb territory likely moved to the - then newly formed - Republic
of Croatia (IDMC 2009). I will therefore focus on Bosniaks and Serbs from now on.
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6This is also true for the larger sample of all household heads and their spouses in the
LSMS data set, not just the ones with children in school that is used here.
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